Mosaddegh: The Legacies of Mohammad Mosaddegh in Iran and Zviad Gamsakhurdia in Georgia - Political History Book (Ahead of Their Time Series) | Middle East & Caucasus Studies, Academic Research, Political Biography

Nicolas Gorjestani is uniquely equipped to write a pair of books about “two visionary political leaders who devoted their lives to the struggle for independence and liberty in Iran and Georgia.” Gorjestani was raised in Iran by a Georgian father and a Ukrainian mother; speaks Persian (Farsi), Georgian, Russian, French, and English; received his undergraduate and graduate education in economics and international affairs in the United States; and held economist and managerial positions in the World Bank for almost 40 years.This review is of the first book of the pair, but a long introduction covers both books and seeks to draw some parallels between the two leaders as well as present conceptual and theoretical considerations that underpin the two stories.In addition to reviewing the extensive published literature on Mosaddegh (the bibliography is 15 pages), Gorjestani researched declassified documents from the British Archives, the Foreign Relations of the United States series and had unique access to recently declassified documents of the World Bank concerning that institution’s role intermediating between Mosaddegh’s government and the British government in the wake of Iran’s nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). This documentary research was supplemented by many interviews of key actors and analysts in Iran and other countries. The endnotes total 142 pages covering 543 pages of the main text, so though the analysis is Gorjestani’s, it is extensively documented as befits a scholarly work.Book 1 like Book 2 is divided into major sections entitled Origins, Governance, Destiny, Legacy, and an Epilogue – this structure leads to some repetition to make each section coherent and complete. But the result is a detailed analysis filled with original insights.Gorjestani also reviews critiques of Mosaddegh and seeks to draw lessons for national and international actors. To this reviewer, who was Gorjestani’s colleague in the World Bank for over 20 years, the most fascinating part of the book is its well-documented revelation that in the early 1950s the World Bank did not serve as a neutral party when intermediating between the British and Iranian governments in the aftermath of the AIOC nationalization. Rather the World Bank, as revealed by its own archives, tilted heavily in favor of the British, something the sagacious Mossadegh was able to detect. If the Bank had played a truly neutral role, perhaps the 1953 coup against Mosaddegh, orchestrated by the CIA and the British MI6 as also thoroughly documented, could have been avoided.Two other findings of Gorjestani’s research surprised even him.First, the US role. The common understanding is that American machinations in Iran started with the coup and its aftermath. In fact, the record suggests that the US interest in Iran and its oil goes back to FDR. The goal was to take over a piece of the oil pie in Iran. The US and the UK were engaged in a behind-the-scenes game of chess/poker for decades leading up to Mosaddegh era. US strategy sought to (a) initially, support Iran’s nationalization (American diplomats actually encouraged Iranian nationalists to nationalize oil, and promised the US would help them restart the operations), while weakening the Brits (e.g. Truman’s bloc on a UK invasion of Iran to repossess oil facilities); and (b) once Eden offered Acheson a piece of the oil pie (Nov ‘51 meetings in Paris), the US went full in to support UK, including with the coup.Second, Mosaddegh is generally associated with the nationalization of the oil industry. In fact, Gorjestani shows that Mosaddegh’s legacy is much more than that. His bold, innovative political, economic, social reforms toward an “Iranian social democracy” were his greatest policy contribution. As noted in the book, the Mosaddegh’s social security scheme for workers was unprecedented in the region and came only 15 years after FDR’s in the US. Similarly, the “economy without oil” strategy, developed under Mosaddegh, was essentially a successful adjustment program to deal with external shocks. The program was undertaken decades before such approaches became the policy recommendation of the Bretton Woods Institutions. Mosaddegh conceived and executed this program without any technical or financial support from either the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, confirming that he was indeed “ahead of his time.”